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Antiterrorismus: The German Experience
with Politically Motivated Violence
James I. Nelson*
In arriving at the decisions that we are now forced to make, we shall be
guided by only one objective: the continued well-being of our country in a
shared and free world .... It is around this that everything revolves.
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder**
I. Introduction
Terrorism experts, an apparently huge class of individuals if their
ubiquitous presence on television screens is any indication, tell us that
terrorists lurk everywhere. On occasion, we are instructed that the threat
is statistically insignificant and that we should go about our daily
business in much the same way as we did prior to the attacks of
September 11, 2001. The best perspective, as in most cases exhibiting
extreme and contradictory perspectives, lies perhaps somewhere in the
middle.
The United States has encountered terrorism on many occasions and
in a wide range of incarnations.1 For the first time, however, Americans
are confronted with an immediate and pervasive threat at home that
originates from a foreign source. The nation's political leaders,
* The author spent the first two and half decades of his life in Germany. He
experienced first-hand many of the security measures enacted at U.S. military facilities in
Germany during that time, particularly in the wake of the RAF assassination attempt of
General Kroesen and the retaliatory air strikes against Libya in response to that country's
sponsorship of a bombing in Berlin. Most surreal is the memory of heavily-armed and
Kevlar-wearing soldiers-detailed for the task from nearby Mannheim-guarding over
his high school prom at the Heidelberg castle. The author holds the M.S. in International
Relations with a specialization in international security studies.
** German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Address to the Bundestag (German
Federal Parliament) (Sept. 19, 2001) (translated by author).
1. For example, the destruction, by means of a suicide attack, of the marine
barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983; the 1996 actions against U.S. servicemembers in
Saudi Arabia; and the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania. See Tim Ito, Twenty Years of Anti-American Terror, WASH. POST,
April 30, 1999, available at http://www. washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/world/terror/
overview.htm (last visited March 30, 2002).
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accompanied by the above-mentioned experts and media pundits, are, at
the time of this writing, engaged in the consideration of an expansive
range of measures designed to, it is hoped, effectively counter future
terrorist threats. Some critics warn that the proposed tactics do not go far
enough to address the threat, whilst others caution that the constitutional
rights and civil liberties that form the very foundation of America are
2threatened by the suggested measures.
This comment does not purport to offer "correct" answers to the
prevailing uncertainty; instead, it urges the reader to learn from the
examples presented by the experience of one of the closest allies of the
United States, the Federal Republic of Germany. Germany,
unfortunately, has a wealth of experience in contending with the
phenomenon of terrorism. There too, both foreign and domestic actors
and groups have perpetrated this insidious form of violence. The
measures taken by Germany have been incremental, arising in response
to actual and perceived threats, and, as evidenced by realities on the
ground, they have ultimately been quite effective. There is much to be
learned from the German experience in terms of addressing which
measures present the greatest likelihood of success.
The approach undertaken here is to address, initially, the
inescapable query of what actually constitutes terrorism. Phrased
differently: when is an act of violence terrorism and when is it not?
2. A number of measures initiated by and/or implemented at the behest of the Bush
administration have sparked debate. Three of these measures stand out: the widespread
detention of individuals suspected of possibly having a part in the events of September
11, 2001 or information pertaining thereto; the decision to permit federal authorities to
monitor conversations between suspected terrorists and their attorneys; and the Executive
Order that permits secret military trials of suspected terrorists. The following excerpt,
relating to detentions, illustrates the type of concerns revolving around these and other,
similar issues:
It is unknown whether the detainees are considered conspirators in the worst act
of terrorism in U.S. history, valuable witnesses or merely people who might
have information because they crossed paths with the terrorists responsible for
the deaths of about 5,300 people Sept. 11 A senior federal law enforcement
official involved in the investigation, speaking on condition of anonymity, says
the detention of material witnesses and others is "pushing the envelope" of civil
liberties. The source says some people are being detained based on
circumstantial evidence and held for a week or longer without legal repre-
sentation or permission to contact family members. "Some of these people
have done nothing more than give someone a ride in their car," the official
says. Defenders of the government's tactics say authorities are doing the best
they can under the law as they investigate an emotionally charged and complex
case that is without precedent. Attorney General John D. Ashcroft said on
ABC's "Nightline" Oct. 11 that the government's actions are consistent with
the framework of law that we operate under."
Lois Romano & Davis S. Fallis, Lock 'Em Up and Throw Away Their Rights? The
Secrecy Around Detainees in the Terror Investigation Raises Questions About Civil
Liberties, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY. ED., Oct. 22-28, 2001, at 29.
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From that vantage-point, Section III considers the history of terrorism in
Germany and the motivations of the terrorist actors that have operated
there. Section IV presents an overview of the German legal system and
the philosophical underpinnings of Germany's approach to counter-
terrorism.
Section V then undertakes to address the central aspect of this
comment: the German response to terrorism. This entails examination
and analysis of a number of factors that include: the country's counter-
terrorism laws and policy framework; the organization and coordination
of resources; and governmental oversight and review. Section VI builds
upon this framework in considering Germany's involvement and
cooperation with international initiatives geared towards combating
terrorism. European Union ("EU") and United Nations ("UN")
initiatives have been the primary vehicles for Germany's cooperation in
this arena and will be considered accordingly.
Section VII studies the contemporary state-of-affairs. Part and
parcel thereof is consideration of the changing face of terrorism and a
summary of Germany's newest counter-terrorism measures. Section
VIII concludes this comment by offering a few suggestions,
prognostications, and final observations.
II. What is Terrorism?
The study of terrorism has been described as "a huge and ill-defined
subject [that] has probably been responsible for more incompetent and
unnecessary books than any other outside the field of sociology... [i]t
attracts phonies and amateurs as a candle attracts moths. 3  These
thoughts accurately reflect the fact that rational and pragmatic dialogue
concerning terrorism is a rare occurrence. The topic has been
sensationalized, mystified, and politicized by policymakers and the
media; the latter's behavior, as a group, sometimes crosses boundaries of
journalistic ethics and good taste and the former, as a group, too often
utilize the phenomenon as a vehicle for unrelated components of their
political agenda. The subject is ill-defined because so many definitions
have been offered, with few proving to be satisfactory.4 Despite efforts
to arrive at a broadly accepted definition of terrorism, consensus has
3. V.S. Pisano, Contemporary Terrorism and the West, OCCIDENTE, Summer 1993,
at 28 (photocopy on file with author) [hereinafter Contemporary Terrorism].
4. See NOEMI GAL-OR, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO SUPPRESS TERRORISM 1
(1985). German Law does not define terrorism, but a working definition provided by
German government officials states that terrorism is the permanent fight for political
goals and change to the political system through assaults against persons and property.
See GAO, infra note 56.
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never been achieved.5 This may not appear to be an unlikely result in the
international community, but, surprisingly, the same difficulty frequently
manifests itself in homogeneous regions, as well as within states.6 In the
United States, for example, various agencies have independently
established different criteria to identify the occurrence of a terrorist
event. 7  The perceptions, and objectives, of an actor attempting to
formulate a definition of terrorism directly influence the content and
scope of that definition. 8 The detached academic will likely attempt to
provide a more scientifically precise meaning than an agency leader who
has thoughts of increased funding or a national leader of a developing
country concerned with strengthening a fragile hold on power against a
threatening opposition group.
Perhaps the most accurate way to "define" terrorism is to give
consideration to the qualities that characterize it. A functional definition
might be proposed at the outset: politically motivated criminal violence
perpetrated by clandestine groups or by clandestine means. 9 Thus, one
5. See Contemporary Terrorism, supra note 3.
6. See id.
7. The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as "the calculated
use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to
intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political,
religious, or ideological." See The Terrorism Research Center, The Basics of Terrorism,
at http://www.terrorism.com/terrorism /bpartl.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2001). The
United States Department of State adheres to the definition provided in 22 U.S.C. §
2656f(d), where terrorism is defined as "premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents,
usually intended to influence an audience." That definition is further refined by the
description of "international terrorism" as "terrorism involving citizens or the territory of
more than one country." See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2000 PATTERNS OF GLOBAL
TERRORISM, available at http://www.state.gov /s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/ (last visited Oct.
15,2001).
8. When first affording attention to the subject of terrorism, people are often
surprised at the lack of agreement over precisely what behavior constitutes "terrorism."
There are a number of reasons for this absence of consensus, three of which are
particularly important. First, given its pejorative connotation, the term terrorism elevates
what may be a routine crime to a dire social problem, or relegates what may be a
legitimate political movement to the fringes of society. Secondly, by affixing the label
"terrorist" to a group or category of behavior, a government increases its power by virtue
of the phenomenon that citizens tend to be more amenable to heavy-handed governmental
tactics when they perceive such tactics as a response to terrorism. Otherwise
unacceptable measures-such as curtailed civil liberties-are suddenly acknowledged to
be a necessary evil because they are designed to combat an even greater evil. On the
intra-governmental level, the heads of agencies or departments have come to realize that
terrorism is a "golden goose": associating a mission with counterterrorism equates to the
influx of funds for the agency or department. Relating to this tendency is a third factor, a
pervading lack of precision that serves to complicate matters, as in the case of using the
term terrorism to describe what drug traffickers do to society. See JONANTHAN R. WHITE,
TERRORISM: AN INTRODUCTION 5, 6 (2d ed. 1998).
9. Telephone Interview with Dr. Vittorfranco S. Pisano (B.A., Fordham University;
Dott. di Giur., University of Rome; Master of Comparative Law, Georgetown
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encounters characteristics such as political, criminal violence,
clandestine, and groups. The central tenet of such an attempt at a
definition is the requirement that political objectives comprise the basis
of the definition. Criminal violence can be seen to be an essential
component as it stands in juxtaposition to the legitimate or lawful use of
force. 0 Clandestinity, both in the organizational respect and in the sense
of the acts committed by the terrorist group, is an important variable in
that it underscores the difference between the terrorist group and others
who seek political change. Terrorists who plan and operate under cover
are quite different than the sometimes violent political factions that are
prepared to act in the open or the disgruntled mob that is collectively
drawn into violent behavior." The last important aspect of this
definition is that terrorist acts are committed by groups.
1 2
Notwithstanding the case of Timothy McVeigh, should one choose to
characterize the Oklahoma City Bombing as the work of a single person,
individuals acting on their own should not be considered terrorists since
the goal of bringing about and playing a central role in political change
or upheaval is quite beyond the reach of a solitary actor. Put simply,
terrorism is an activity practiced by movements in the pursuit of political
power; the larger the group, the greater its effectiveness.'
3
This approach to defining terrorism is similar to that adopted by the
United States Department of Defense ("DOD"). The DOD definition of
terrorism is "the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to
inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or
societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or
ideological."1 4  A possible criticism of the DOD definition is the
distinction made between political and religious or ideological motives.
While religion or ideology may be manipulated by the terrorist, it is
debatable that these factors, rather than primarily political objectives,
form the ultimate raison d'Otre for the terrorist group. 5
University), Visiting Fellow, NATO Defense College, Rome, (Oct. 26, 2001). Dr.
Pisano, a specialist in international security and comparative government, has lectured at
a number of institutions, including the U.S. Defense Intelligence College, Georgetown
University's Department of Government, the U.S. Army War College, and Troy State
University's European Division. He has served as a consultant to the U.S. Senate
Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism and as Senior Foreign Law Specialist in the
European Law Division of the Library of Congress. He is a member of the Rome, Italy,
Bar and the author and/or editor of over 100 publications on political and security issues.
10. Id. ("When a military force or police agency makes use of violence it does so
with a legal mandate; the violence committed by a terrorist group in pursuit of its
political aims is not sanctioned in any legal sense, hence it is criminal.")
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See The Basics of Terrorism, supra note 7.
15. See generally White, supra note 8, at 5-9.
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Most definitions leave unsaid an important evolutionary dynamic
that must also be present. Terrorist movements have at their genesis a
radical or revolutionary subculture that provide individuals with the
desire, ability, and means to exploit political, social, historical and/or
religious grievances. 16 The existence of such a subculture gives rise to
subversive agitation that, in turn, gives birth to a terrorist group itself 1 7
III. Terrorism in Germany
The year 1968 marked the advent of terrorism in Germany. 18
Terrorism in Germany was the result of a gradual, decade-long
evolution.19 At its source was the importation by young Germans of
American pop-culture and its tenets of young rebellion.20 This rebellion
was magnified by college-aged German radicals who became an
outspoken protest movement that, ironically, had perceived U.S.
injustices as its biggest grievance.21 Violence became a mode of
expression when these increasingly militant radicals subordinated the
value of human life to the importance of their political beliefs.22 Part and
parcel of these beliefs were hostility towards the U.S. military presence
in Germany 23 and the "cyclic revival of the ecological, anti-nuclear, anti-
16. Pisano interview, supra note 9.
17. Id.
18. See White, supra note 8, at 190. On April 3, 1968, the founders of the Baader-
Meinhof gang, the progenitors of the Red Army Faction ("RAF"), set fire to two
department stores with incendiary bombs. These individuals, ideologues of the left and
students at the Free University of Berlin, had previously relied upon the student protest
movement and group confrontations with police to express their political beliefs. Id.
19. See generally Schura Cook, Germany: From Protest to Terrorism, in TERRORISM
IN EUROPE 154-78 (Yonah Alexander et al. eds., 1982).
20. See id.
21. See id
22. See id.
23. V.S. Pisano, Terrorism in Western Europe, in TERRORIST DYNAMICS: A
GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 66 (V.S. Pisano, ed., 1988) [hereinafter Terrorism in
Western Europe] (photocopy on file with author). At the height of the Cold War,
more American soldiers were stationed in Germany than in any other European
country. Pisano emphasizes that the American targets of the RAF stood out:
In 1972, the RAF bombed the U.S. Army V Corps Headquarters in Frankfurt,
killing one person and injuring 13, and the U.S. Army European Headquarters
(USAREUR) in Heidelberg, killing three persons and injuring five. In 1981, it
bombed the U.S. Air Force European Headquarters in Ramstein, injuring 20
persons, and fired a Soviet RPG-7W rocket launcher in Heidelberg against the
armored limousine of General Frederick Kroesen, the USAREUR Commander-
in-Chief, slightly injuring him and his wife. In 1984, it bombed U.S. military
installations in Frankfurt, Wertheim, Wiesbaden, and Mannheim. In 1985, near
Wiesbaden, it murdered U.S. Army SP4 Edward Pimental to obtain his military
identification card and bombed the U.S. Air Force base in Rhein-Main, killing
two persons and injuring eleven.
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military, pacifist movement. ' 24
As the activities of the Baader-Meinhof Gang grew in both
frequency and gravity, the German government focused upon the threat
that the group presented to the safety of the populace; German law
enforcement agencies were subsequently able to effectuate a series of
arrests of key members of the terrorist group.2 5 Notwithstanding these
arrests, the group, now called the Red Army Faction ("RAF"),
demonstrated a remarkable resiliency, as evidenced by continuing
bombing attacks.26 The RAF's activities were carried forth via the
replacement, in the field, of the imprisoned leaders, but also by virtue of
the fact that the incarcerated members of the group were able to continue
to exert an influence over activities from within the walls of their
specially constructed prisons.27 It was later realized that the attorneys
who represented the imprisoned terrorists and who frequently paid them
visits were conveying orders to RAF subordinates on the outside in
addition to smuggling contraband materials into the prison. 8
In 1977, allies of the RAF, who were comprised of ideologically
similar groups and individuals, from both Germany and neighboring
European countries, hijacked a commercial airliner and executed the
pilot.2 9 Soon thereafter, the RAF itself kidnapped and murdered Hanns-
Martin Schleyer, a prominent German industrialist. 30  These and other
similar actions were of immense importance in the German
government's struggle against terrorism as they served to unequivocally
turn the vast majority of public opinion against left-wing terrorist groups
operating in Germany and other European countries. 31 The targets in the
RAF's ongoing campaign included: "judges and prosecutors, political
figures, businessmen, and government officials, as well as property of
24. See id. at 64.
25. See White, supra note 8, at 191. Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof were
amongst those arrested; prior to their apprehension they renamed their group the Red
Army Faction. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Terrorism in Western Europe, supra note 23, at 65. Pisano notes that RAF
members saw themselves "as the elitist vanguard of the proletariat [that] condemn[ed]
revolutionary spontaneity, adopted a rigid [organizational] structure, stress[ed] long-
range operational planning, and tend[ed] to be highly selective in their choice of targets."
Id.
30. See GlobalSecurity.Org, Case Studies, at http://www.globalsec
urity.org/intell/library/policy/dod/part6ctanalysiscourse.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2002).
31. See White, supra note 8, at 191. White explains that, prior to this series of
attacks, RAF "members were painted [by the media and various propaganda outlets] as
misunderstood romantics of the revolutionary left." The acts of violence perpetrated in
1977 and later, "exploded" that image. Id.
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symbolic nature. 32
In addition to the RAF, German left-wing terrorism also manifested
itself in the form of the June 2 Movement and the Red Cells (a.k.a. Rote
Zellen, or RZ). 3 The three groups operated independently until 1980
when the June 2 Movement was absorbed by the RAF.34 The RAF's
ability to recuperate from setbacks stemming from successful law
enforcement efforts was due in large part to the structure of the
organization. This structure has been characterized as having had "three
membership tiers: legitimate citizens, active terrorists, and jailed
members," with the group having been "cemented by legitimate
members who maintain[ed] contacts between those in jail and those
conducting operations. 35
In the early 1980s, the frequency of RAF actions decreased and the
group entered into a drawn out period of decline that was punctuated by
intermittent acts of violence. 36 By 1985, the group faced extinction.37
Perhaps in recognition of this fact, the group attempted to revitalize itself
by exclusively targeting NATO interests and via the staging of hunger
strikes by imprisoned members. 38 These measures and others, such as
forging alliances with left-wing terrorists in other European states,
ultimately proved unsuccessful. 9 In 1992, the RAF issued a "peace
proclamation" that heralded the end of the group's nearly twenty-five
year period of violence.4°
The RAF's diminishing activity in the 1980s was compensated for
by the aforementioned Red Cells, a group that never established ties with
the RAF.41  Both groups existed at the extreme left of the political
spectrum, yet the two differed significantly in their core beliefs,42 with
32. See Terrorism in Western Europe, supra note 23, at 66.
33. See White, supra note 8, at 191.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 192 (citing Hans-Josef Horchem, Terrorism in West Germany, in
CONFLICT STUDIES 186 (1986)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. White, supra note 8, at 191.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Terrorism in Western Europe, supra note 23, at 67.
42. See generally David Schiller, Germany's Other Terrorists, TERRORISM 9, 1987,
at 87-99. Schiller explains that the members of the Red Army Faction had as their
inspiration Marighella-style leftists. These individuals held that Latin American
revolutions would take place in urban environments and be effectuated via popular revolt.
The revolts were to be triggered by violent acts conducted by underground operatives,
thereby obviating the need for the larger scale guerilla-style tactics claimed indispensable
by revolutionaries such as Emesto "Che" Guevara. Carlos Marighella was the most well-
known advocate of this approach. Marighella, initially a Brazilian public office holder
and the leader of that country's communist party, became renowned as a revolutionary
terrorist leader who was killed by Brazilian Police in 1969. Marighella's two major
[Vol. 20:3
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the Red Cells often denouncing what they perceived to be the RAF
membership's intellectual arrogance.4 3  Unlike their high-minded
counterparts, the Red Cells sought support from the lower rungs of
society (i.e., the urban poor and the unemployed). 4  The Red Cells
differed markedly from the RAF in organizational structure (part-time
members, with regular jobs and sans police records, existing in loosely
affiliated cells), tactics (greater frequency of attacks geared at symbolic
property rather than persons), and objectives (to serve as a catalyst for a
popular uprising). 45  Given these differences, the group presented an
entirely different challenge for Germany's legal and law enforcement
communities. The zenith of Red Cells' activity came in the late 1980s,
but they too proved unable to survive beyond the early 1990s.
Right-wing terrorism has not proven to be a significant problem in
Germany. Neo-Nazi or rightist terrorist attacks have taken place since
the early 1980s, including a number of murders, but they have been
infrequent and the groups perpetrating the attacks are characterized by
their lack of organization and their tenuous nature.46 This relative
absence of right-wing terrorism in Germany should not be misunderstood
to mean that right-wing violence does not occur on a regular basis in
Germany. Xenophobic violence, directed at immigrants and
Gastarbeiter (foreign laborers) is certainly on the rise in Germany,
particularly since the German reunification and largely as a result of, for
example, the misplaced resentment of unemployed and undereducated
youths.4 7 This behavior, akin to mob violence when committed by two
or more individuals is not, however, "terrorism.
' 48
works were For the Liberation of Brazil and The Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla, two
titles that had a tremendous influence on later generations of terrorists.
43. See White, supra note 8, at 191.
44. See Schiller, supra note 42, at 87-99.
45. See Terrorism in Western Europe, supra note 23, at 67.
46. Id. at 68. One of the few groups that had to be reckoned with was the Militaer
Sport Gruppe Hoffman (Military Sports Group Hoffman). This group was founded by a
man named Karl Heinz Hoffman in the late 1970s and was defined by the devotion of its
members to a strict regime of intensive military training. Hoffman, accompanied by
fifteen of his followers, traveled to Beirut, Lebanon, in 1979 where they received terrorist
training from the former leader of Black September. Upon their return, the group
murdered two German citizens; in response, the German police immediately went into
action against the group and, in short order, arrested most of its members. As a result of
those arrests, and more that followed, the group became defunct by the mid-I 980s. See
White, supra note 8, at 198.
47. See generally Patrick A. Taran, Migration, Globalization, Human Rights:
Defining the Next Decade, in Zukunft der Arbeit IV: Arbeit und Migration, at 12,
available at http://boell.de/downloads/arbeit/zukunf tarbeit41.pdf (last visited Apr. 24,
2002).
48. In making this point, the initial remarks concerning the definition of terrorism
are raised. The definition for terrorism proposed at the outset is instructive: politically
motivated criminal violence perpetrated by clandestine groups or by clandestine means.
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While the vast majority of terrorist violence in Germany has
stemmed from domestic left-wing sources, the country has also been the
scene of international terrorism. In their heyday, groups like the RAF
were thought to have links with foreign groups beyond the boundaries of
Europe, but these LINKS were widely considered to be difficult to
initiate and maintain due to "linguistic differences, diverse
environmental conditions, geographical distances, communication gaps,
frontier-crossing problems, identity documents requirements, and overall
logistical and financial considerations. ' 49  When connections were
discovered to exist, they tended to be ones of ideological solidarity,
shared political objectives, intelligence sharing, logistical support, and/or
training.50 Operational cooperation between a German terrorist group
and one from beyond the periphery of Europe has not manifested itself to
any appreciable degree.
51
Germany, however, has been forced to contend with terrorist attacks
committed unilaterally by groups from parts of the world beyond Europe,
particularly from the Middle East, the Magreb, and Eastern Europe. 2
The most horrific attack was undoubtedly the seizure and subsequent
murder of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics by members of
Black September, a Palestinian group.
3
IV. Overview of the German Legal System
Germany's Grundgesetz, or Basic Law, serves as the country's
constitution.54 The country is administered via a federalist system in
which authority is shared by the centralized federal government and the
sixteen Laender, or states.5 5 Not unlike federal agencies in the United
States, Germany's parliamentary government features a variety of federal
ministries responsible for the provision and oversight of a wide array of
When a Berlin "skinhead" or a group of neo-Nazis in Hamburg accost the man from
Ghana in public they are not acting to further a calculated political objective and they are
neither a clandestine group nor are they utilizing clandestine means. They are thugs
acting out of ignorance and, not infrequently, are fueled by excessive amounts of alcohol.
49. See Terrorism in Western Europe, supra note 23, at 78.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 81. The most significant foreign origins-with respect to both the country
of origin of individual groups as well as state-sponsored groups-have been Libya, Iran,
Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Turkey, and Armenia. Groups with Palestinian roots have
been perhaps the most problematic. Id.
53. See Charles Bierbauer, Munich Remembered: 1972 Attack Led to Increased
Security, CNN Interactive, July 27, 1996, at http://www. cnn.com/US/9607/27/
munich.remembered/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2002).
54. See generally LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION,
GERMANY-A COUNTRY STUDY, at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/defoc.html (last visited
Jan. 2, 2001) [hereinafter LIBRARY OF CONGRESS].
55. See id.
[Vol. 20:3
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government services.56 As in most parliamentary governments, the
executive branch plays the dominant role in matters of policy-making,
with selected members of the legislative branch also serving in the
chancellor's cabinet.
57
The primary German approach to contending with individuals
accused of terrorist violence is to prosecute suspects for the commission
of acts that violate general criminal laws, such as murder, arson,
kidnapping, or hijacking, rather than specific "terrorist" offenses.58
Legislation geared specifically towards terrorism is mainly of a proactive
nature; it tends to be designed to empower law enforcement and to
facilitate procedural efficiency in the state's efforts against terrorism.
Germany's Laender do not have their own criminal or criminal
procedure laws, but they rely solely on the German Criminal Code and
the Criminal Procedure Code, which are both federal laws. 59 As such,
German criminal law is characterized by uniformity and is quite different
from that found in the United States, where, in addition to federal
criminal law, each of the fifty states has its own criminal law.6 ° With the
exception of the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court of Justice),
an appellate court, all relevant German criminal courts are those of the
respective Laender.
61
56. See generally UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, COMBATING TERRORISM: How FIVE FOREIGN COUNTRIES
ARE ORGANIZED TO COMBAT TERRORISM (April 2000), available at
http://nsi.org/library/terrorism//ns00085.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2001) [hereinafter
GAO].
57. See id. As the chancellor is also the head of the majority political party, the
majority faction in the parliament does not independently guide the formulation of policy
to any appreciable extent. Id.
58. See id. The GAO report cites the rationale for this approach provided by
officials in Canada, where terrorist acts are treated in like fashion: "treating terrorism as
ordinary crime removes the political element and thereby dilutes the effectiveness of the
terrorist act." Id.
59. See Volker F. Krey, Characteristic Features of German Criminal Proceedings:
An Alternative to the Criminal Procedure Law of the United States?, 21 LoY. L.A. INT'L
& COMp. L. REv. 591, 592 (1999). The German Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, or StGB)
and the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung, or StPO) are federal statutes
that apply in all German states. See Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German
Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better
Solutions?, 28 B.C. IriT'L & COMP. REv. 317, 319 (1995).
60. See Krey, supra note 59, at 593.
61. Id. Unlike the United States Supreme Court, Germany's
Bundesverfassungsgericht (the Federal Constitutional Court) does not hear final appeals;
that function is one reserved to the Bundesgerichtshof Germany's Basic Law limits the
Bundesverfassungsgericht's jurisdiction to constitutional issues (i.e., questions
concerning the Basic Law). See Library of Congress, supra note 54. While several
hundred local courts, the Amtsgerichte, deal with minor criminal offenses, it is the
regional courts, the Landesgerichte, that initially hear weightier criminal matters-such
as those related to terrorism. At the next level are the state appellate courts, the
Oberlandesgerichte, which also have original jurisdiction in cases of treason and anti-
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Citizens are guaranteed certain civil rights and liberties via the
Basic Law and federal statutes; for example, the police are prohibited
from subjecting suspects to physical abuse, torture, drugs, deceit, and
hypnosis.62 If an individual is arrested, he or she must be afforded an
appearance before a judge within twenty-four hours of arrest, at which
time the judge must either issue an arrest warrant, wherein the basis for
the arrest is specified, or else order the police to release the person from
custody.63 If the judge issues an arrest warrant, the suspect may then
identify a person whom the authorities must notify of the arrest.
64
Though a person accused of a criminal offense is entitled to free access
to legal counsel, this right, as is further discussed below, has been
curtailed somewhat where the individual is suspected of having
committed terrorist violence.65 As in the United States, criminal trials
are public matters and individuals are protected against double
jeopardy.66
V. Germany's Response to Terrorism
The response of the German federal legislature to terrorism has
evolved in a gradual and incremental manner. As discussed above, in
prosecuting those accused of committing terrorist violence, primary
reliance is placed upon general criminal statutes. Notwithstanding this
practice, a number of important laws have been enacted since the early
1970s that specifically target the particular dangers presented by
terrorists.
A. 1974 Ergaenzungsgesetz zum 1. Strafverfahrensreform- gesetz. 6 7
The Ergaenzungsgesetz zum 1. Strafverfahrensreformgesetz
(Supplementary Law to the First Law on the Reform of the Criminal
Procedure Statute) was enacted as a consequence of Red Army Faction
defendants being represented by an inordinate number of defense
68attorneys. In some cases, RAF members were represented by as many
as a dozen lawyers each.69 Aside from the fact that the sheer number of
attorneys involved in a proceeding often resulted in numerous procedural
constitutional activity. The Federal Supreme Court of Justice, the Bundesgerichtshof is
the final court of appeals in criminal matters. Id.
62. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 54.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. §§ 137.1, 138(a), 146, 231(a) StPO (German Criminal Procedure Statute).
68. Juergen Meyer, German Criminal Law Relating to International Terrorism, 60
U. COLO. L. REV 571, 576 (1989).
69. Id.
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delays, some of the attorneys were also suspected, and sometimes
accused, of assisting their incarcerated clients by relaying
communications, orders, and instructions to operatives outside the prison
walls, as well as to other imprisoned RAF members.7°
The 1974 Supplementary Law addressed these problems. The Law
provides that each defendant in a terrorism-related trial can have no more
than three defense attoreys; 71 it put an end to the practice of one
attorney representing numerous terrorism suspects;72 it makes it possible
to remove or exclude a defense attorney when there is reason to believe
that the attorney is conspiring with his or her client for criminal
purposes;73 and it makes it possible to try defendants in absentia.74 The
last provision was designed to counteract disruptive behavior by
defendants during court proceedings or where, due to self-inflicted
injuries (e.g., hunger strikes), the suspected terrorist cannot be present at
trial.75
The general intent of the Supplementary Law is to prevent
procedural abuses, to streamline proceedings, and to prevent trials from
deteriorating into chaotic spectacles. 76 As proceedings held in the years
following its enactment have demonstrated, the Supplementary Law
appears to have satisfied its underlying aims.77
B. 1976 Antiterrorismusgesetz
7 8
Germany's next step was to enact the Antiterrorismus gesetz (Anti-
terrorism Law), in which it criminalized the formation of any terrorist
group, which has been defined as the establishment of "groups whose
purposes or activities are aimed at the commission of murder,
manslaughter, genocide, or other serious offenses., 79  The law is
significant in several respects. First, simply organizing such a group, or
being a member of one, is sufficient to subject an individual to the
70. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 54.
71. § 137.1(2) StPO.
72. § 146 STPO.
73. § 138(a) StPO. At least two lawyers were sentenced for smuggling weapons and
ten others were charged with exploiting their legal position to promote terrorism. See
GERHART HOFFMEISTER & FREDERIC C. TUBACH, GERMANY: 2000 YEARS; FROM THE
NAzi ERA TO GERMAN REUNIFICATION 178 (1992).
74. § 23 1(a) StPO.
75. See Meyer, supra note 68, at 576.
76. See generally Generalbundesanwalt (Federal Attorney General) Rebman,
Terrorismus und Rechtsordnung (1987), available at http://
www.nadir.org/archiv/PolitischeStroemungen/Stadtguerilla+RAF/ RAF/brd+RAF/04
(last visited Dec. 10, 2001) (translated by author).
77. See id.
78. § 129(a) StGB (German Penal Code); §§ 112.3, 148.2 StPO.
79. See Meyer, supra note 68, at 577.
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maximum punishment of a ten-year prison sentence; no proof of the
commission of a violent act is necessary for a conviction.8 ° Second, the
law reduced due process protections for terrorist suspects by lowering the
standard of proof required to be shown by the state in order to detain a
suspect prior to trial; thus, suspicion suffices where, ordinarily, the
requirement is that there is a legitimate flight risk or a danger of criminal
collusion.8 ' Particularly interesting, in light of the contemporary
controversy in the United States regarding a similar government tactic,
82
is a third characteristic of the Anti-terrorism Law: it makes it possible
for the German government to monitor communications between a
terrorist suspect and his or her attorney.83
C. 1977 Kontaktsperregesetz84 and 1978 Gesetz zur Aenderung der
Strafprozessordnung85
The third stage in Germany's counter-terrorism effort came as a
direct response to the RAF's kidnapping of Hanns-Martin Schleyer, a
prominent German industrialist who was also the president of the
Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbaende (German
Employer's Union).86 Schleyer did not survive the abduction, but, while
he was still believed to be alive, German authorities suspected that
incarcerated RAF leaders had not only initiated the kidnapping but also
continued to direct the kidnappers from behind prison walls.87 To
prevent these "management" activities, the Kontaktsperregesetz (Law
Banning Contacts) provided "a legal basis for cutting off from the
outside world those members of the RAF awaiting trial. 88
Also arising as a consequence of the Schleyer episode was the
Gesetz zur Aenderung der Strafprozessordnung (Law on the Reform of
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Dan Egan, Justice for All? Critics Say Ashcroft's Aggressive Methods to Fight
Terrorism Go Too Far, WASH. POST WKLY. ED., Dec. 3-9, 2001, at 7.
83. See Meyer, supra note 68, at 577.
84. §§ 111, 148.2 StPO.
85. §§ 111, 148.2 StPO.
86. See Rebman, supra note 76; see also Hoffmeister, supra note 73, at 176.
87. See Hoffmeister, supra note 73, at 176. The RAF's objective in kidnapping
Schleyer-and in the hijacking of a Lufthansa passenger jet just six weeks later-was to
force the government to release Andreas Baader and other RAF prisoners. The
kidnapping ended with the murder of Schleyer at the hands of his kidnappers and the
hijacking ended in a "spectacular rescue action" in Somalia, when a special unit of the
German Bundesgrenzschutzgruppe (Federal Border Police), the GSG-9, stormed the
airplane and liberated the hostages. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 54. With
neither of the two operations successful, Baader and three other imprisoned RAF leaders
committed suicide. Id.
88. See Meyer, supra note 68, at 577.
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the Code of Criminal Procedure). 89 The law permits law enforcement
authorities to operate more restrictive road checkpoints and, by barring
all physical contact between an attorney and a client incarcerated for
terrorist activities, further restricts the attorney-client relationship in the
context of terrorism.90
D. 1986 Strafverfahrensaenderungsgesetz91
The fifth terrorism-specific law introduced in Germany was an
additional Code of Criminal Procedure reform law, the
Strafverfahrensaenderungsgesetz of 1986. This amendment to the Code
facilitates dragnet-like police operations by permitting authorities to
compile dossiers on any individuals, both citizens and visitors to the
country, suspected of involvement in terrorist activities, irrespective of
whether the individual has a prior criminal record.92 By permitting the
collection of up to three months' worth of data on any such individual,
counter-terrorism efforts are not hampered by the need to conduct ad hoc
intelligence gathering and synthesis during critical periods when time is
of the essence (i.e., during a hostage crisis). 9 3
E. 1986 Gesetz zur Bekaempfung des Terrorismus94
Prior to the events of September 11, the most recent anti-terrorism
legislation had been the Gesetz zur Bekaempfung des Terrorismus (Law
on the Fight Against Terrorism). This 1986 law criminalizes certain
conduct, such as "propagandizing violence by distributing writings or
providing instructional guidance for the commission of a violent act at a
meeting, ' 95 in order to prevent the instigation of violence via the printed
media or public speech.96
F. Overview of Terrorism-Related Legal Framework
The steps taken by Germany to counteract terrorist violence have
imparted a distinct imprint upon the country's substantive criminal law
and criminal procedures. One can see that Germany has taken a two-
pronged approach in its efforts. First, it has adhered to the default
89. See id.
90. See id. Upon enactment of the law, prison reception cells-where attorneys met
with their clients-were fitted with a glass pane or wall to prevent the exchange of
objects. Id.
91. § 163(d) StPO.
92. See Meyer, supra note 68, at 578.
93. See Rebman, supra note 76; see also Meyer, supra note 68, at 578.
94. §§ 129(a), 130(a) StGB.
95. See Meyer, supra note 68, at 578.
96. See id.
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approach of subjecting those accused of terrorist violence to general
criminal charges, such as homicide and arson. When a criminal is found
to have acted with terrorist intent, a harsher prison sentence may be
imposed. Second, proactive criminal statutes, designed to address the
fundamental root causes of terrorism, have been enacted, and these laws
have placed general prohibitions on both anti-social and anti-
constitutional behavior. By making it illegal to form or belong to a
terrorist organization, Germany's lawmakers have made the clear
political statement that politically-motivated violence will not be
tolerated. This is underscored by the fact that expressions and
communications in support or promotion of achieving political objectives
by violent means have been criminalized. Free speech concerns clearly
play second fiddle to interests of public and state security.
G. Organization and Coordination ofAnti-Terrorism Resources.
The Staatsministerien des Innern of the respective Laender (state-
level ministries of interior) oversee police, intelligence, and emergency
preparedness in their geographical jurisdictions. 97 Each of these state
ministries, in turn, is represented in a council of interior ministers, which
is responsible for maintaining a unified approach to resolving issues that
fall within the ministries' sphere of authority.98 The federal appointee
responsible for the development of a comprehensive policy framework
and the coordination of the efforts of the state-level ministries is the
Koordinierer der Nachrichtendienste des Bundes (Coordinator of State
Intelligence Services). 99 The person holding the position of Intelligence
Coordinator is a cabinet-level advisor to the German Chancellor.'
00
The Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police Bureau), or BKA,
shares jurisdiction with the Laenderkriminalaemte (state-level police
agencies) in the area of maintaining domestic security. 101 The BKA also
collaborates with law enforcement authorities in Europe and beyond.
10 2
The scope of the BKA's authority is not unlike that of the United States'
97. See GAO, supra note 56.
98. See id.
99. See id
100. See id. One might draw parallels between the duties and responsibilities of the
German Coordinator of State Intelligence Services and those of both the U.S. Director of
Central Intelligence and the Director of Homeland Security. Legislative oversight is
conducted by a parliamentary standing committee on internal affairs that monitors the
police and intelligence service compliance with relevant laws. See GAO, supra note 56.
Judicial oversight comes via the Bundesrechnungshof (Federal Court of Audit). Id.
101. See generally the Bundeskriminalamt internet homepage, at
http://www.bka.de/about/text.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2001) (translated by author)
[hereinafter BKA].
102. See id
[Vol. 20:3
ANTITERRORISMUS
Federal Bureau of Investigation, in that state-level police hold initial
responsibility for dealing with crimes committed within their respective
jurisdictions, but, when criminal acts involve behavior that crosses state
or international boundaries, the centralized BKA is relied upon to
address the matter. 0 3 The exception to this jurisdictional framework is
that the BKA is responsible for the protection against and investigation
of acts of terrorism and political extremism. 10 4 As might reasonably be
expected, the state-level police may be called upon to assist the federal
police in the counteraction and investigation of terrorist violence.' °5 The
BKA Gesetz vom 7. Juli 1997 (1997 BKA Law) 10 6 codified the BKA's
oversight of numerous tasks, to include centralized criminal intelligence
gathering, international law enforcement cooperation, witness protection,
and the protection of the jurists of the Constitutional Court. 107
The most well-known German counter-terrorist organ is the
Bundesgrenzschutz (Federal Border Guard), a para-military police
agency that has evolved from its initial role of staffing border facilities to
its present incarnation as a highly visible force that provides security at
virtually all federal sites, which will include airports, and one that assists
state-level police when large forces are needed. 10 8  The
Bundesgrenzschutz also encompasses the elite Grenzschutzgruppe 9, or
GSG-9, one of the world's premier special operations units.'
0 9
VI. International Initiatives and Cooperation
Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the American
experience with terrorism had been almost exclusively international in
nature. 110 In Germany, and throughout the rest of Europe, domestic
103. See id.
104. See GAO, supra note 56.
105. See id.
106. Gesetz ueber das Bundeskriminalamt und die Zusammenarbeit des Bundes und
der Laender in Kriminalpolizeilichen Angelegenheiten (Law on the Federal Criminal
Police Bureau and Cooperation Between Federal and State Authorities in Criminal
Matters), BGBl 1997 S. 1650-1664 [hereinafter BKA Law]. See also BKA, supra note
101.
107. See BKA, supra note 101.
108. See generally the Bundesgrenzschutz internet homepage, at
http://www.bundesgrenzschutz.de (last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (translated by author)
[hereinafter BGS]. See also GAO, supra note 56.
109. See BGS, supra note 108. The duties of the GSG-9 were specified by the
Conference of the Ministers of the Interior, in 1974, as police missions of special
significance and cases where the situation requires a single operation that focuses
immediate and overwhelming force against violent criminals, such as larger, organized
groups of terrorists. Id.
110. See Bruce Hoffman, Is Europe Soft on Terrorism?, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer
1999, at 62, 73 (on file with author).
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terrorism has proven to be the biggest threat."' Accordingly, these
disparate experiences have given rise to notably different perceptions and
reactions, evidenced by the American tendency to "regard counter-
terrorism as something akin to a moral crusade, [whilst] Europeans are
far more skeptical of blanket approaches and rigid policies and instead
adopt what they see as more practical and, in their minds, more
productive approaches." ' 12 While, in the wake of September 11, the
United States government has taken forceful steps to enhance domestic
security, the tendency towards moralistic references in framing the
terrorist threat can be seen to persist. 13
Germany is part of a European cooperative effort against terrorism
that has its roots in what was known as the TREVI Arrangement,
concluded by the European Community ("EC") in 1976.114 The TREVI
Arrangement provided for regular meetings of EC ministers of justice
and interior, and other high-ranking government officials, whereby the
participants could share and discuss security concerns and their possible
resolutions. 15 This cooperative European effort proved to be quite
successful in combating terrorism: one of the highpoints was a 1987
joint operation, conducted concurrently in Germany, France, and Italy,
that effectively eliminated the organizational infrastructure of the Islamic
terrorist group Hezbollah in Western Europe. 1 6  The TREVI
Arrangement was replaced by the third pillar of the 1992 Treaty on
European Union (the Mastricht Treaty) which, while not singling out the
phenomenon of terrorism as an underlying rationale, does apply to
immigration and asylum, policing, customs, and legal cooperation.17
Again, one can see in this provision the continental tendency towards
applying general laws in counter-terrorism efforts." 18 The 1992 treaty
also mandated the institution of Europol, a European police office, to
"facilitate cooperation between the national police forces of European
Union (EU) member states and to provide a joint information-sharing
system covering a variety of crimes, [to include] illicit drug trafficking,
money laundering, and terrorism."" 9 Germany, as is the United States,
is also a member of Interpol, an international police organization that, at
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See generally L. Paul Bremer, III, A New Strategy for the New Face of
Terrorism, NAT'L INTEREST, Thanksgiving 2001, at 23 (on file with author).
114. See Hoffman, supra note 110, at 71. TREVI is a French acronym for
"Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and International Violence." Id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 71-72.
118. See GAO, supra note 56.
119. See Hoffman, supra note 110, at 72.
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present, has a total of 178 member states. 12 Interpol promotes measures
similar to those of Europol; in the context of terrorism, Interpol's former
secretary general has described those measures as "intelligence collection
and intelligence analysis again and again, undercover operations, satellite
observation, phone and mobile-phone tapping, e-mail interception, and
use of information technology. 121
Germany is also a party to the 1977 European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism,122 an agreement intended to counteract
terrorism by fostering the cooperation of the judicial authorities of the
respective member states. 123 Specifically, it requires member states to
prosecute individuals apprehended on the basis of a terrorist offense or
else extradite them to the state in whose territory the crime was
committed. 124  While a fundamental weakness of the agreement is its
provision that member states may reserve the right to refuse extradition
for an offense considered a political crime, Germany has taken
affirmative steps to limit the political offense exception.
125
Germany is a fully committed participant in the international
community's efforts against politically motivated violence, as reflected
by its signing of each of the twelve multilateral conventions sponsored
by the United Nations that are designed to combat terrorism. 126 With the
120. Moises Naime, Meet the World's Top Cop: Interpol's Raymond Kendall
Explains Why the World Has Him Worried, FOREIGN POL'Y, Jan./Feb. 2001, at 31, 32-33
(on file with author). Founded in 1923 as the International Criminal Police Commission
(ICPC), the organization is now referred to by the ICPC's telegraphic address, "Interpol."
Id.
121. See id. at 38.
122. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, Europe
T.S. No. 90 (reprinted at 15 I.L.M. 1272).
123. See Meyer, supra note 68, at 575.
124. See id.
125.See id. Professor Meyer explains that: The Zustimmungsgesetz, or Law of
Approval, of the convention passed the German Federal Parliament on March
28, 1978. This law provides that a serious offense is not to be deemed political
if: 1) an offense results in death or serious bodily injury of the victim; 2) an
offense endangers the life or physical integrity of a large number of persons; or
3) an offense is considered to be inhuman or involves the use of devices
creating a collective danger to persons.
Id. at 575, n.22 (citations omitted).
126. See Informationsaustausch Ueber den Verhaltenskodex zu Politisch-
Militaerischen Aspekten der Sicherheit (Information Exchange Regarding Stances on
Political and Military Aspects of Security), Deutsches Auswaertigesamt (German Foreign
Ministry), Internet Homepage, at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice
/download/pdf/friedenspolitik/abruestung/kodexaustausch.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2002).
In order of introduction, the conventions ratified by Germany are the Convention on
Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft [hereinafter Tokyo
Convention], Sept. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft [hereinafter Hague Convention], Dec. 16, 1970, 860
U.N.T.S. 105; the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation [hereinafter Montreal Convention], Sept. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; the
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exception of two of the conventions, the ratification of which are pending
at the time of this writing, the agreements have been formally adopted by
the German legislature. 127 In addition to these multilateral agreements,
Germany has also entered into bilateral compacts on cooperation against
terrorism and organized crime128  and on mutual assistance and
extradition. 129  Given the increasing concerns regarding the access of
terrorists to weapons of mass destruction, it also bears noting that
Germany is a party to a variety of United Nations agreements against the
proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.'30
VII. Contemporary State-of-Affairs
The attacks of September 11 removed all doubt that the threat from
terrorism has undergone a paradigmatic change. Emphasis has shifted
from the ideologically motivated terrorist of previous decades to the
contemporary zealot who is not only unconcerned with the catastrophic
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, U.N. GA Res.
34/154 (XXXIV) U.N. GAOR, 34 Sess., Supp. No.46 at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/146
(reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 255); the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, March 3, 1980, 1456 U.N.T.S. 101; the Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving Civil Aviation Supplementary to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Feb. 24, 1988, ICAO Doc. 9518 (reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 627); the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988,
I.M.O. Doc. SVA/CON/15 (reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 668); the Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental
Shelf, I.M.O. Doc. SVA/CON/16 (reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 685); and the Convention on the
Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, March 1, 1991, ICAO Doc.
S/22393 & corr. 1 (reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 721). The two agreements upon which German
ratification is pending are the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, G.A. Res. 165, U.N. GAOR, 52 Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/52/164; and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR 6 th Comm., 54 Sess., 76 th mtg.,
Agenda Item 160, U.N. Doc. A/54/109.
127. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
128. Germany has entered into agreements on cooperation against terrorism and
organized crime with the Republic of Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Hungary, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgz Republic, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Switzerland, the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. See Report to the Security Council
Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) Concerning Counter-
Terrorism, Annex, at i, available at http://www.germany-
info.org/relaunch/politics/new/ctcbericht .pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2002 [hereinafter
Security Council Report].
129. Germany's bilateral agreements on mutual assistance and extradition are with
Australia, Austria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, and the United States. See Security Council Report, supra note 118, at iii.
130. See Security Council Report, supra note 128, at iv.
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consequences of his act, but who actively seeks such an outcome.13' The
"traditional" terrorist committed violence to draw attention to a cause in
the belief that people would sympathize with and rally to that cause if
only they were made aware of the grievances upon which it was based. 
132
Terrorists of this sort operated under the assumption that indiscriminate
mass killing would alienate those whose support they were attempting to
rally to their cause.133  This rather rational and, correspondingly,
predictable model for terrorist behavior can no longer be relied upon.
The "new" terrorist does, however, take advantage of the same two
asymmetrical advantages that have always made terrorists such
formidable opponents: first, the defender must protect every conceivable
vulnerability while the terrorist need only select an opportune target and
then strike; second, the logistical and financial outlay incurred by the
terrorist in launching an attack is a miniscule fraction compared to the
cost that the state must bear in defending against and reacting to it. 134
While the traditional terrorist remains a threat to be reckoned with, the
new terrorist poses an exponentially greater danger.
Since the attacks upon the United States, Germany has taken a
number of steps that build upon the already strong foundation for
combating international terrorism. 135  On September 19, 2001, the
German cabinet adopted the "First Anti-Terrorism Package," which
provided for enhanced air-traffic security. 136  The "Second Anti-
Terrorism Package" was passed by both the Bundestag (German Federal
Parliament) and the Bundesrat (German Federal Council), and
subsequently entered into force on January 1, 2002.137 The second
"package" includes a wide array of new security provisions as well as
regulations pertaining to the rights of foreigners in Germany; the intent
of the latter being to prevent the entry of terrorists into the country and to
enable law enforcement organs to identify terrorists already present in
Germany.' 38 In light of the fact that a number of the terrorists who
carried out the September 11 attacks, as well as several of their suspected
131. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Assessing "Terrorism" Into the New Millennium, 12
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 1, 16 (1999/2000).
132. See Bremer, supra note 113, at 23.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 25. Mr. Bremer notes that "[t]he September 11 attacks probably cost
less than $2 million and caused over $100 billion in damage and business interruption.
Id.
135. See Security Council Report, supra note 128, at 1.
136. See id. The package mandated stepped up security at each of the country's
thirty-seven airports, to include the 100% screening of hold baggage and the increased
use of sky marshals to prevent hijackings. Id.
137. See id. at 2.
138. See Security Council Report, supra note 128, for a comprehensive discussion of
Germany's proposed anti-terrorism measures.
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accomplices, had close ties to the German city of Hamburg, these tactics
are well-justified. The measures introduced to achieve those goals
include the placement of biometric characteristics in passports and
personal identification cards, and increasing the amount of counter-
terrorism intelligence to which police authorities have access. 139
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Germany
adhered to its established practice of international cooperation via the ad
hoc creation of a "special task force of more than 600 police experts to
deal with the Al-Qaida network, in close cooperation with the competent
authorities of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and
other partner states."'
' 40
An additional approach to combating terrorism, the importance of
which is increasingly deemed to be of paramount importance, is that of
tracking and blocking the funds that are utilized to finance terrorist
organizations and their operations.' 4' To prevent and suppress the
financing of terrorist acts, Germany has initiated legislative and
administrative steps with the objective of counteracting non-transparent,
global capital flows and financial transactions of criminal origin. 14' Part
and parcel of these objectives are amendments to the Kreditwesengesetz
(German Banking Act); the adoption of a
Geldwaeschebekaempfungsgesetz (Law on the Prevention of Money
Laundering); and continued reliance on § 129(a) of the German Criminal
Code, which criminalizes the financing of terrorist activities. 143
VIII. Conclusion
Germany's evolutionary approach to grappling with the issue of
terrorism is instructive. The facts on the ground reflect a degree of
success in counteracting and, particularly with respect to domestic
sources of terrorism, overcoming threats that is perhaps unmatched by
any other country. Germany's approach is one that reflects awareness
that there is no such thing as immediate gratification when it comes to
attaining security against terrorists. Rather than couch the struggle in the
potentially counter-productive rhetoric of a war of "good versus evil,"'
44
139. See id.
140. See id. at 2.
141. See Bassiouni, supra note 131, at 17. Acts of terrorist violence that could result
in harm of a catastrophic nature require funding beyond the cost of conventional weapons
or explosives. Id. The lengthy and elaborate preparation undertaken by the many
terrorists who participated in the September 11 attacks quite clearly required a significant
amount of capital.
142. See generally Security Council Report, supra note 128, at 3-7.
143. See id.
144. One observer has described the American employment of the term "war" to
characterize the efforts against terrorism as one with potentially dangerous consequences:
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Germany's strategy has been to steadfastly adhere to the fundamental
strategy of treating terrorism as it does any other serious crime.
Germany's counter-terrorism framework is unambiguous
concerning the command and control of national resources vis-a-vis the
preemption of terrorist acts and the response to those attacks that can be
carried out. In contrast, in the United States the newly appointed
Director of Homeland Security must wade through a morass of over forty
federal departments, agencies, and bureaus that play a part in American
efforts to counteract terrorism. 145 While the German system
acknowledges that the resources of many governmental agencies must be
brought to bear on the dangers posed by terrorism, its efforts are closely
coordinated and channels of communication between the ministries, both
horizontal and lateral, are kept open and flowing.
In light of the changing nature of terrorism, it is Germany's embrace
of international cooperation, and the manner in which it goes about doing
so, that is particularly noteworthy. The German approach to
international cooperation in this area is one premised upon pragmatism,
shared resources, and open dialogue. To describe this approach, one
might utilize the term "collaboration," rather than simply "cooperation."
A collaborative model stresses the extensive exchange of information
and resources, reliance upon the respective strengths of coalition
members, and receptiveness to the adoption of novel strategies.
Widespread adoption of such a collaborative approach undoubtedly
hinges upon the ability of potential participants to discard entrenched
viewpoints regarding certain international initiatives and proposed
institutions. Today's terrorist is one that takes full advantage of
globalism, in terms of both resources and potential impact. The
international terrorist response must be in kind.
Human nature makes it unlikely that terrorism will ever be defeated
or eliminated. So long as there exists the hunger for power, there will
exist that minority that is willing to resort to violence in an attempt to
acquire it. The danger, however, can be reduced. Doing so requires
recognition of the fundamental reality that no state can go at it alone.
146
"[t]o declare that one is at war is immediately to create a war psychosis that may be
totally counter-productive for the objective being sought. It arouses an immediate
expectation, and demand, for spectacular military action against some easily identifiable
adversary, preferably a hostile state-action leading to decisive results." See Michael
Howard, What's In a Name?: How to Fight Terrorism, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2002,
at 8.
145. See GAO, supra note 56. The GAO report also points out that "some federal
resources to combat terrorism were being increased without a clear link to likely threats
and that programs were being developed based on vulnerabilities, not likely terrorist
attacks." Id.
146. The attacks of September 11 occurred on American soil but the impact was
global: citizens of some eighty countries were killed that day. Underscoring the global
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ramifications is evidence that, prior to September 11, Al-Qaida was involved in terrorist
attacks and subversive activities in not only the United States and Germany, but also in
Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Sudan, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan,
France, the United Kingdom, and, of course, Afghanistan. See generally Maureen F.
Brennan, Avoiding Anarchy: Bin Laden Terrorism, the U.S. Response, and the Role of
Customary International Law, 59 LA. L. REV. 1195 (1999).
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